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Abstract
This paper aims at bringing together two debates in metaphysics that
so far have been kept separate: the debate about determinism vs. in-
determinism as de re modality on the one hand, and the debate about
persistence on the other hand. Both debates significantly involve talk
of things. We will show that working out a proper semantics for sin-
gular terms and an accompanying theory of things, motivated by con-
siderations of quantified modal logic, can significantly further the per-
sistence debate. We will use our semantic framework to give an argu-
ment in support of the endurantist (3-dimensionalist) position as the
best theory of persistence.
Abstract (deutsch)
Das Ziel dieses Aufsatzes ist es, zwei metaphysische Debatten mitein-
ander zu verbinden, die bislang unverbunden nebeneinander stehen:
die Debatte um Determinismus und Indeterminsmus im Sinne von
Möglichkeit de re einerseits, und die Persistenzdebatte andererseits.
In beiden Debatten spielt die Rede von Dingen eine wichtige Rolle.
Es wird gezeigt, dass eine adäquate, durch Überlegungen zur quan-
tifizierten Modallogik motivierte Semantik für singulare Terme und
eine damit verbundene Theorie von Dingen die Persistenzdebatte deut-
lich voranbringen kann. Im Rahmen unserer Theorie geben wir ein Ar-
gument für Endurantismus (Dreidimensionalismus) als beste Theorie
von Persistenz.
∗Copyright by the author. Forthcoming in Philosophia Naturalis.
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1 Introduction
The metaphysical debate about the determinism or indeterminism of the world we
live in (only one possible future, or many?), is hardly ever mentioned when it comes
to the metaphysical question of how things persist (how a thing can remain the
same through changes in the course of time). We believe that this points to a blind
spot in the debate, rather than conceptual independence, and that a combination
of both debates can lead to new insights for the question of persistence. We will
argue that the connection should be forged via an appropriate semantics for singular
terms that refer to things: the phenomena of persistence and de re modality call for
the same semantical approach.
Prima facie, it doesn’t seem too far-fetched to expect some interaction between
the questions of determinism and persistence, as both questions are about the tem-
poral development of the world around us and the things in it. To be precise, the
question of determinism would also arise in a world (unlike ours) in which there
are no things, but just, e.g., a single field with a changing state. We will however
assume that we are dealing with a world in which there are things. On that ba-
sis, we immediately have a sufficient condition for indeterminism: if there is one
thing in the world that can persist in more than one way (one thing that has open
possibilities for its future), then the world is indeterministic. (Depending on how
strongly one reads the assumption that we are dealing with a world of things, this
condition may also be necessary for indeterminism.)
So, here is a first link: any unrealized possibility of a persisting thing (an unre-
alized possibility de re) is sufficient for indeterminism. We may safely assume that
any of the normal things around us is a witness for indeterminism in that sense.
Surely, e.g., the glass of water on the table before me can persist until tomorrow or
be destroyed today: two incompatible possibilities for its future development, only
one of which will be realized.1
This link between indeterminism and persistence can hardly be denied, but it
may also seem rather trivial.2 It is less clear whether the fact of indeterminism
(assuming, together with common sense, that it is a fact) also teaches us something
1As one referee remarked, “can” has a variety of uses. In the example, “This glass can be de-
stroyed today”, it is used in the sense of circumstantial modality as one form of root modality (see
Kratzer, 1991). In contrast to the sentential operator form “It is possible that this glass is destroyed
today”, which normally has an epistemic reading, (“It is compatible with all I know that . . . ”), cir-
cumstantial “can” modality has metaphysical import: it is modality in our world, based on real
potentialities of things. See also Vetter (2010).
2To some it will also seem quite dubious—apart from the worry mentioned in note 1, there is of
course also a significant debate about the status and the right analysis of de re modality. See §3.6
below for some comments.
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interesting about persistence.3 Given that there are things facing more than one
possible future development (and, to repeat, it is hard to deny that all things around
us are like that), the following question arises: Which implications does this have
for the persistence debate? Is the fact that there are numerous non-trivial de re
possibilities for things, of any help in deciding the thorny question of how things
persist?
Recall that in the recent persistence debate, there are three rival accounts, one
three-dimensionalist theory, endurance, and two four-dimensionalist theories, per-
durance and exdurance. According to the endurantist view, a normal thing is a
three-dimensional entity that persists (remains the same through changes) “by be-
ing wholly present at more than one time”:4 probably the best sense one can make
of this is: at each moment of its existence, it is present with all of its parts.5 En-
durantism is the commonsensical view; the main challenge for endurantism, the
problem of change, is to explain how one and the same thing can have differ-
ent (intrinsic) properties (at different moments). The four-dimensionalist approach
to persistence is motivated by the conviction that the problem of change is in-
surmountable. According to the perdurantist view, which avoids this problem, a
thing is a four-dimensional entity that persists in the sense that there are different
temporal parts, or stages, of the thing, at different times. These stages are them-
selves different things, and it is unproblematic that they can have different intrinsic
properties. The normal thing itself is, according to that view, a four-dimensional
“space-time worm”, which is not wholly present at any one time. Exdurantism is
also a four-dimensionalist theory; however, in contrast to perdurantism, exduran-
tism takes the normal things we deal with to be stages and not space-time worms.
Again, the problem of change is avoided as different stages can of course have
different intrinsic properties. In a sense, exdurantism denies our normal concep-
tion of persistence: normal things according to exdurantism are just stages, and
stages do not persist. Exdurantism, however, posits a temporal counterpart rela-
tion between stages to account for our normal talk of persistence, much like a
counterpart-theoretic account of modality de re, and in this sense, it is still a theory
3As we will see, it will be enough for us if it is acknowledged that indeterminism is a (metaphys-
ical) possibility: that already provides enough motivation to adopt a framework in which persistence
can be represented in a novel, elucidating way.
4This phrase is Lewis’s, who attacks endurantism (Lewis, 1986, 202); it did not come up as an
attempt at a useful positive characterization of endurantism. (See McCall and Lowe (2009) for rele-
vant critique of Lewis’s framing of the debate, as well as for the following positive characterization
of endurance: “An object endures iff (i) it lacks temporal parts, and (ii) it exists at more than one
time.”.) Still, the Lewisian phrase has stuck, so we will use it as well. It is however in need of
elucidation. We aim at providing such elucidation below.
5Never mind the fact that things can lose parts—e.g., shed a hair—and still remain the same. See
note 4 above for the artificiality of the slogan.
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of persistence (see Sider, 2001).
Our main question will be: can the phenomenon of indeterminism, as wit-
nessed by non-trivial de re modality, contribute anything to the debate about per-
sistence? We will approach this question indirectly, from a semantic perspective:
we will argue for a useful semantics for singular terms that does justice to de re
modality, and we will ask about the impact of that framework if transformed to a
temporal setting. It will turn out that all three mentioned theories of persistence can
be modeled in our proposed framework, which we take to be good news in favour
of the neutrality of our approach. In terms of metaphysics, we take this result
to favour endurantism as the commonsensical view: in metaphysics as in dealing
with other complex matters, it is good methodology to subscribe to the principle
“if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it” (Lowe, 2009, 91), and so we should stick to what we
started from.
Before we begin with our semantical investigation, we need to comment on
another discussion in the vicinity of our subject matter, viz., the debate between
a presentist A-theory of time and an eternalist B-theory.6 This is a thorny issue;
there is even a substantial debate over whether there is a substantial debate be-
tween A- and B-theory at all (Meyer, 2005; Savitt, 2006). However that may be,
it is clear that there is a significant difference at least in outlook on the status of
a semantic framework, which is relevant for our enterprise. A truly presentist se-
mantics, such as envisaged by Prior (1968), will have to treat semantics ultimately
hermeneutically: our presentist natural language can only be elucidated by use of
that same language (see Müller, 2007). Formal semantics is however mostly treated
model-theoretically, implying a stance “above” the language to be modeled and the
material it talks about; from such a stance, a whole semantic model, and thus, all
of (space-)time, has to be accessible. Model-theoretic semantics is therefore essen-
tially B-theoretic. In line with Prior, we acknowledge the power of model-theoretic
methods in semantics, and we will proceed using a standard model-theoretic out-
look, but we do not take this to settle the A vs. B debate in favour of B-theory; on
the contrary, we want to let the A-theoretic position stand as a live option. (We
do not even want to take a stance on whether ultimately there is a substantial is-
sue between A- and B-theory.) Our reason for proceeding in a B-theoretic setting
is purely pragmatic: it is simply much easier to formulate semantic assumptions
model-theoretically.7
6We wish to remain neutral and not take a stance here as to whether there are implications between
an A- or B-theory of time and the different views of persistence.
7An A-theoretic reformulation may well be possible along the lines of Prior’s idea of capturing
B-theoretic model theory in A-theoretic terms; cf. his notion of “grades of tense-logical involvement”
(Prior, 1968) and the ensuing development of hybrid logic, for which see, e.g., Blackburn (2000) and
Braüner (2011).
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Here is how we will proceed. We start by discussing the phenomenological
basis of our enterprise in §2. In §3, we lay out our semantic framework in detail,
using mainly the phenomenon of de re modality and considerations of quantified
modal logic as the underlying motivation. Then, in §4, we apply the framework
to the persistence debate and give our argument in favour of endurance as the best
theory of persistence.
2 The phenomena of persistence and de re modality
Both indeterminism in the sense of de re modality and persistence are phenomena
involving things. What is that: a thing? There is much debate about this notion in
metaphysics. While we cannot hope to resolve the issue, a discussion of the notion
of a thing will certainly be helpful to motivate our semantic framework. We will
therefore proceed with the aim of fixing a notion of a thing that identifies the right
sort of entity for the phenomena of persistence and de re modality.
We use singular terms to refer to things. This cat, my daughter’s cat Hannibal,
is such a thing; I can refer to him, for example, by pointing to him now, or via the
singular terms “this cat” (as used now), or “Hannibal”. (I can also refer-to-him-
and-stroke-him, which he likes.) Hannibal, the cat I’m referring to, wouldn’t be a
cat if he didn’t have a certain history typical of cats—he was born of a cat, and he
grew up from a small, blind newborn kitten to become quite a hunter. Hannibal has
a history; he also has a huge number of de re modal properties, forming what we
may call his modal profile. He’s inside now, but he could be outside now as well;
he left some of his food in the bowl, but he could have eaten it all. He could not,
however, turn into a dog or a butterfly. He can persist in many different ways, but
not in all imaginable ways. There are distinct de re possibilities open for him, and
his persistence is constrained in many ways, given that he is a cat.
This is the phenomenological basis from which we will start. At least the cen-
tral cases in which questions of de re modality and persistence make sense, involve
proper things, things of a specific kind. We should be happy if we can lay out a
theory of persistence that is able to handle these clear cases appropriately and that
gives a (hopefully illuminating) verdict on less clear cases. It would be asking too
much, however, if we were looking for a theory of indeterminism and persistence
that is geared towards just anything we can refer to. In order to elucidate the no-
tion of a (proper) thing further, we need to provide a useful semantics for singular
terms.
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3 Establishing a useful semantics for singular terms
3.1 Extension vs. intension
Many semantic frameworks, from Frege to Montague and beyond, distinguish be-
tween two aspects of pieces of language: their extension and their intension. It is
commonly acknowledged, for example, that while the predicates “animal which
has a heart” and “animal which has a liver” specify the same extension (they are
true of the same animals), still they specify that extension in different ways; it
could be, one thinks, that the extensions are different.8 According to Frege, who
generalizes such considerations, even a sentence has an extension (a truth value)
and an intension (a thought or proposition).9 Frege’s student Carnap proposes an
even more general, regimented use of the extension-intension distinction. Accord-
ing to him, we should strive for a semantic theory in which each separate piece of
language has an extension and an intension, where the intension is now a function
specifying all possible extensions (the extensions in all possible cases). Carnap
calls this “the method of extension and intension” (see Carnap, 1947, Ch. I).
Inspired by Carnap, Bressan (1972) suggests a fully symmetrical use of the
extension/intension idea, which does away with the idea, still present in Carnap,
that each piece of language has an extension simpliciter. According to Bressan, in
many applications the possible cases (represented by a set of cases Γ) should all
be treated as equally basic, as far as logic is concerned. Belnap has accordingly
suggested to call that framework case-intensional semantics.10 The main idea is
that each piece of language ξ has an extension extγ(ξ ) in each case γ ∈ Γ, and its
intension int(ξ ) is simply the corresponding function from cases to extensions:
extγ(ξ ) = (int(ξ ))(γ); int(ξ ) = λγ(extγ(ξ )).
At the ground level of the logical framework, there is no longer a suggestion that
we must, or even should, distinguish a “real case” from other “merely possible”
cases: the framework is fully symmetrical with respect to the cases. This will be
important for our employment of the framework below.
8At this stage, the epistemic possibility of a difference in extension is enough to motivate the
assumption of a difference in intension (broadly construed). In the framework of case-intensional
semantics to be laid out below, it would depend on the details of the model under consideration
whether the (technically specified) intensions of the mentioned predicates really differ or not.
9Frege’s notions of Sinn vs. Bedeutung do not coincide with the present-day distinction of in-
tension vs. extension. Historically, however, they formed an important source of inspiration for the
development of that distinction.
10For a nice exposition of the framework, see Belnap (2006) ; for further developments, see Belnap
and Müller (2012). We follow the latter in matters of detail.
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3.2 Singular terms: extension and intension
There is a substantial debate whether it is useful to apply the extension/intension
distinction to singular terms; the most hotly debated question is whether we can
assume that proper names have an intension in any useful sense. From the point
of view of case-intensional semantics, this question has an easy answer: as far as
logic is concerned, we should start with the extension/intension distinction quite
generally; principles restricting the generality of the framework should be intro-
duced, and argued for, at the level of science or metaphysics, but not at the level of
logic or semantics. Like any other piece of language, a singular term α therefore
has both an intension int(α), and an extension extγ(α) = (int(α))(γ) in each case
γ ∈ Γ. As a background assumption for the framework, there has to be, beside the
set of cases Γ, a domain of extensions, D, so that extγ(α) ∈ D.11
3.3 Identity and predication
As a next step in giving an overview of the framework, it is useful to see how pred-
ication and identity statements are handled in case-intensional semantics. First,
some pertinent terminology: we call a predicate P extensional if the question
whether Pα holds in a case γ , for α any singular term, can be answered solely
on the basis of the extension of α in case γ , extγ(α). Predicates that are not ex-
tensional are called intensional; they look, as it were, beyond a given single case.
The basic slogan for case-intensional semantics in this respect is “identity is ex-
tensional, predication is intensional”. That is, the basic semantic resources for
predication allow for intensional predication, while the basic semantic resources
for identity statements are purely extensional.
Put formally, this means that an identity statement “α = β”, with α and β
singular terms, is true in case γ iff extγ(α) = extγ(β ); thus, it is true or false solely
on the basis of the extensions of the terms involved.12 A predicate P, on the other
hand, is treated as a piece of language with an extension extγ(P) in each case γ , and
a corresponding intension int(P). What is the extension of a predicate? There are
two obvious choices. If one wants predication to be extensional, as in first-order
logic, then one will assign a subset of the domain D as the extension of a one-place
predicate: extγ(P) ⊆ D. P then applies to α in case γ iff extγ(α) ∈ extγ(P). The
more general choice, adopted in the framework of case-intensional semantics, is to
treat predication as intensional in each case. That is, the extension of a predicate P
11Technically it turns out not to matter whether there is a single domain containing extensions at
all cases, or there are different domains Dγ at different cases, as long as their cardinality is the same.
12This does not limit expressivity, since necessary identity, i.e., identity in all cases, can be ex-
pressed as α = β , using the modal operator “necessarily” (or, idiomatically, “in any case”) that
quantifies over all cases; see §3.4.
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in a case γ , extγ(P), sorts not extensions (members of D), but individual intensions
(functions from Γ to D) into those to which the predicate applies in the given case
and those to which it doesn’t. In this way, predication in a case can still look
further than that particular case: predication is basically intensional. Extensional
predicates turn out to be a special case: a predicate P is extensional in case γ if and
only if, if Pα and α = β in that case, then also Pβ .
Although extensional predication is a special case logically speaking, it is the
usual case from a pragmatic point of view: a large number of important predicates
are extensional. Our chief use of non-extensional predicates is in connection with
sorts of things (see §3.8 below).
3.4 Modality
In case-intensional semantics, it is rather straightforward to implement modal oper-
ators for possibility and necessity. Instead of the usual slogan of modal logic, “ne-
cessity is truth in all (accessible) possible worlds”, which triggers a metaphysics
of possible worlds as wholly separate but mutually accessible entities, of which we
should be suspicious, we can use a metaphysically neutral slogan that is also id-
iomatic English: something is necessary if it is true in any case. Dually, something
is possible if it is true in some (possible) case.13
As usually, the modal operators are written as “” (“necessarily”) and “♦”
(“possibly”), and we can treat “♦” as an abbreviation for “¬¬”. The semantics
of “” is given by universal quantification over cases: φ is true in a case γ iff φ
is true in all cases γ ′ ∈ Γ. Note that unlike in standard Kripke semantics for modal
logic, here no relation of accessibility is needed, and the modal system is therefore
simply S5.
Now we have a notion of modality; does this help us to spell out modality de
re? As argued above, we are looking for modality de re in a literal sense: modality
of things. So we need to have a good look at the interrelation of singular terms
and things in order to understand de re modality. We start by looking at so-called
“empty” singular terms.
3.5 Singular terms: “empty” terms
It is a well known fact, which has given rise to a lot of semantic effort, that some
syntactically well-formed singular terms “misbehave”: they do not single out any-
13Hereby we certainly cannot give a reductive analysis of possibility: we have to know that the
cases are possible before we can employ them here. The same holds true, however, of the more
common possible worlds talk—actually, even more so in that mostly, over and above the possible
worlds, a relation of relative possibility (“accessibility”) is invoked.
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thing. In our framework, we can already make a distinction at that point: among the
so-called “empty” or “non-referring” singular terms, there are some, like “the odd
prime”, which do not single out anything in any case; they are, so to speak, com-
pletely empty. The most famous example of an “empty” singular term, Russell’s
(1905) example of “the present king of France”, is however interestingly different:
it does not single out any person now, but it did in earlier times. If cases are tempo-
ral (we will come to that below in §4), we can say that “the present king of France”
singles out somebody in some (earlier) cases, but not now (in the present case, as
it were).
There are several ways to deal with this phenomenon of emptyness, from Rus-
sell’s much-discussed move of treating definite descriptions as incomplete symbols
to be eliminated in context, to systems of free logic. We go for a simple treatment
of these phenomena, along Frege’s lines: we will use a “throwaway” entity N ∈ D
to handle lack of extension in a case. Thus, if extγ(α) = N, this signals that α does
not exist in case γ . Accordingly, we can define an (extensional) existence predicate,
E: Eα holds in case γ iff extγ(α) 6= N.14
We put “empty” in scare-quotes for a reason. As stated, the term “the present
king of France” hasn’t always failed to single out some person—France was a
monarchy for quite some time. We normally call a term “empty” because it fails to
single out anything now, in what we may want to call “the real case”. We already
said that from the logical point of view of case-intensional semantics, we are not
committed to the existence of a “real case”. Whether there is a “real case”, and
thus an extension of a term simpliciter, depends on the metaphysics of the specific
framework at hand, i.e., on the metaphysical status of the cases in Γ. In standard
modal logic, the “actual world” (in the sense of: the world of a context of utterance)
can be taken to be the “real case”; in linear tense logic, the present time (the time
of the context of utterance) will supply a “real case”. But not all case-intensional
frameworks have to be like that.15 Keeping the semantics symmetrical with respect
to the cases is important for a useful, general semantic framework.
14More properly, relating to what was said about the extension and intension of predicates above,
we say that the extension extγ (E) of the existence predicate in a case γ consists of all those individual
intensions I (all functions I from Γ to D) for which I(γ) 6= N. It turns out, as it should, that if we
have Eα & α = β in a case γ , then we also have Eβ in that case.
15In fact, in an Ockhamist theory such as case-intensional branching time, which is addressed
briefly in note 23 below, there is no “real case”, as none of the possible futures of an utterance
context is singled out above all others. Bressan (1972) also motivates his general framework by
examples from theoretical physics in which one cannot distinguish a “real case”.
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3.6 Singular terms: reference
What does a singular term refer to? Above (§2) we commented on our everyday
assumption about using singular terms: the referent of a singular term such as “this
cat” is a thing—that which has a history, and which has properties, including de
re modal properties. How does this connect with the case-intensional semantic
framework?
The standard way to specify a semantics for singular terms, even in intensional
logics, is firmly rooted in classical predicate logic. Given a world, a time, or an-
other suitable set of parameters of truth (a case, as we would say), a domain of
objects is singled out, and the referent of a singular terms is taken to be one of the
objects in that domain. There is much discussion about the domains (e.g., whether
they are constant across different cases), but the basic assumption is that a domain
is a domain of things. In our terminology, this would mean that the extensional do-
main D is viewed as a domain of things, and that the extension of a singular term in
a case is one of the things from the domain. Together with the common assumption
about the referent of singular terms, this would mean that the referent of a term in
a case (the thing referred to in that case) is its extension in that case—and in fact,
it is common to use “referent” synonymously with “extension”.
We hold that the tradition of predicate logic is pushing in an unhelpful direction
here. Recall that predicate logic was invented initially to deal with difficulties in
the foundations of mathematics: a science of timeless, immutable objects like sets
and numbers—no questions of de re modality, no questions of persistence. It is
clear that the logical framework of predicate logic has to be extended to account
for these more worldly phenomena. Should we hold on to the assumption of a
domain of things? It is the common thing to do, for systems of quantified modal
logic as well as for systems of temporal logic. In case-intensional logic, however,
it will not do: extensions can’t be things, and our domain D cannot be a domain of
things.
It is perhaps best to establish this for the case of de re modality, where the
cases γ ∈ Γ are possible cases in some adequate sense of possibility (no ontology
of “possible worlds” has to be presupposed). This way, we will have an indepen-
dent background for transferring our semantic insights to the temporal case that is
the main objective of this paper. Our consideration is similar to Kripke’s famous
Humphrey objection to Lewis (Kripke, 1980, 45n13), but with a twist that should
make it less debatable. Consider a thing that is red, but that could be green. Fairly
idiomatically we can rephrase this as follows: the thing is red in the case at hand,
but it could be green in another case. In case-intensional semantics this means that
the extensional predicate “. . . is red” applies in the case at hand, γ1, but not in
some other case, γ2: Rα is true in case γ1, but ♦¬Rα is true there as well (where
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R stands for the predicate “. . . is red” and α is a name of the thing in question).
The predicate “. . . is red” being extensional, this means that the extension of α in
γ1, extγ1(α), differs from the extension of α in γ2, extγ2(α), in such a way that “. . .
is red” applies in the one case but not in the other. But this just means that the
extension cannot be the thing in question. There is, by assumption, just one thing,
which is red in one case and green in another. This thing can’t be identical to an
extension in a case, since the extensions in the cases γ1 and γ2 have to be different
in order for an extensional predicate, like “. . . is red”, to apply to one and not to
the other.
This consideration was based on extensional predication. Intensional predica-
tion gives an additional argument. In our framework, an extension is something
confined to a single case (something that can exist at such a case). If we allow for
intensional predication, then in a sentence such as Pα , the singular term α must
refer to the thing, not the extension in a case—otherwise, the intension of P and
the referent of α wouldn’t be enough to give a compositional account of the truth
or falsity of Pα in a case at hand. The upshot is that an individual term α should
be taken to refer to the individual intension int(α), not the extension extγ(α) at a
given case γ .
We can strengthen this verdict by looking at singular terms in more detail. So
far, there has been no restriction on the singular terms and their interpretation at
all: anything goes, including the empty extension at any number of cases. In our
framework, the throwaway entity N is the extension not only for failing definite
descriptions like “the present king of France” (in the present case) or “the odd
prime” (in all cases), but also for regular terms, like proper names, in cases in which
the named object or person simply does not exist. In this respect, “the present king
of France” isn’t very much different from “Socrates”: both specify an individual
intension, and for both, the extension is empty in the present case, but nonempty in
earlier cases.16 “Socrates” isn’t an empty name—it refers; it is just that at present,
its extension is empty. Note that even “the odd prime” has an associated individual
intension; it is however empty in all cases, represented as the constant function
that assigns the throwaway extension N to all cases. Here we may say that it is a
merely technical fact that that singular term refers, whereas in fact we have failure
of reference: the fact that there is a referent, is “implementation dependent” as it
were, depending on our choice to represent failure of a definite description in a case
via assigning the “empty extension”, which in turn is represented by an element N
of the domain D.
16There is one relevant difference: “Socrates” refers to a human being, something falling under a
sortal concept: a proper thing. “Socrates” is, in the terminology of Geach (1980), a name for a man.
“The present king of France”, on the other hand, picks out different human beings at different times;
its individual intension therefore doesn’t fall under any natural sort. See the discussion in §3.8 below.
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For another example of the (potential) “anything goes” of our framework, take
the singular term “Peter’s favourite object”. This may have been a soft toy when he
was two, a bike later on, then something he got from his girlfriend, or his phone.
No matter: the intension of that term is simply some individual intension, a func-
tion from Γ to D. (Quite plausibly we should take the extension of that term
to be N in all those cases γ in which Peter himself doesn’t exist, i.e., in which
extγ(Peter) = N.) Of course, the resources of natural language for specifying indi-
vidual intensions are limited, but in principle, any function from Γ to D could be
the intension of some term, and thus could be referred to. Any individual intension
can be an object of reference.
3.7 Quantifiers
We have argued that singular terms refer to individual intensions, while their ex-
tensions are case-specific. Variables being singular terms as well, this has conse-
quences for the interpretation of quantification: the quantifiers in our framework
range over all possible individual intensions. Thus, in a technical development
of first-order case-intensional semantics, we will need an assignment for the vari-
ables that specifies one individual intension per variable, and the quantifiers will
change that assignment as usual, replacing the appropriate individual intension by
another.17
Can we read these quantifiers in the usual way then, as “for at least one thing
x” (∃x) and “for all things x” (∀x)? This seems doubtful. Consider Peter’s favourite
object again. Even leaving to the side the cases in which there is no extension
for that term, that “object” behaves strangely. It does not make sense to inquire
into “its” persistence, even though the “object” surely has different properties at
different times (for example, “it” is big and fluffy in an earlier case, but small and
hard now). It makes no good sense either to ask about its de re modal properties,
even though “it” could be red, or yellow, or green. The term “Peter’s favourite
object” certainly specifies an object of reference, like any singular term. “Peter’s
favourite object” however doesn’t specify a proper thing.
It is proper things, though, that we normally care about, and whose de re modal-
ity and persistence we are trying to understand. This comes out nicely in a double
reading of the quantifiers, which does not coincide with the purported difference
of “possibilist” vs. “actualist” quantification that is much discussed in quantified
modal logic. What about the sentence
There is something that is Peter’s favourite object,
17This meshes well with the fact that all open formulae create a potentially intensional context:
even the atomic open formula Fx, for F an intensional predicate, is intensional.
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uttered in a case γ? Taking pi to abbreviate the singular term “Peter’s favourite
object”, the sentence seems to have the form “∃xx = pi”, which is trivially true
according to our semantics for the quantifiers (we can just assign to x the intension
of pi). There is however a more interesting reading, which stresses the “thing” in
“something”: in case γ , there is a proper thing that is (in that case) identical with
Peter’s favourite object,
∃x(PT x & x = pi).
Here we use “PT ” to stand for the (intensional) predicate of objects of reference,
“being a proper thing”, to be elucidated in §3.8 below.
The distinction between objects of reference and proper things is made even
more explicit when one tries to force a de re reading for “Peter’s favourite object”.
The natural interpretation for a sentence expressing a de re possibility, such as
Of Peter’s favourite object it is true that it could be green,
is that there is a proper thing (e.g., one of his model trains), which in fact (in the
case at hand) is Peter’s favourite object, and of which the de re modal attribution is
true. The fact that Peter’s favourite object could be something else which in fact is
green (i.e., that there is a case in which the extension of “Peter’s favourite object”
satisfies the extensional predicate “. . . is green”), does not seem enough to make
the displayed de re sentence true. In the same vein, it does make sense to inquire
into the persistence of the proper thing that is actually (in a given case) Peter’s
favourite object, but not to ask how Peter’s favourite thing, considered as an object
of reference, persists.
It is at this semantic level that questions of indeterminism (in the form of de re
modality) and persistence come together.
3.8 Characterizing proper things
So far, the individual intension int(α) of a singular term α is our technical repre-
sentation of an object of reference. Any function from Γ to D can constitute such
an object of reference. In line with our interest in de re modality and persistence,
however, we are mostly interested in proper things, such as cats, pine trees, tables
or cups.18 It is their persistence that a theory of persistence should explain, and
their de re modal properties that a theory of de re modality should illuminate. It
18It is well known that artefacts such as tables or cups pose specific challenges for the notion of
persistence, as illustrated, for example, by Hobbes’s famous example of Theseus’s ship (see Wiggins,
2001, 93f.). At the level of abstraction of the present paper, we will not be concerned with the specific
question of artefact persistence, but just presuppose that the semantics gives us a way of singling out
proper things as belonging to sorts. This semantic mechanism may well be context-dependent.
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would be asking too much, or indeed the wrong thing, if we were aiming at a fully
general theory of modality and persistence for objects of reference. When asked
about the persistence of a thing whose extension in different cases picks out Julius
Caesar, the moon, a piece of chalk and a frog (and maybe that is Peter’s favourite
object), we should simply deny that such a “thing”, even if we can refer to it, per-
sists in any meaningful way, or that we understand what is meant when we hear
that it could be green.
It should be clear now that this development of objects of reference as individ-
ual intensions is different from the standard way of analytic metaphysics, which
would probably construe a general notion of an object as a mereological sum of
temporal parts of ordinary things, if these are acknowledged, or just as (the con-
tents of) a region of space-time. No temporal parts are invoked in our development.
Apart from a leaner ontology, this also means that we can leave the original notion
of a part intact, so that for proper things, “part” just means “spatial part”.
How can we distinguish mere objects of reference from proper things? In our
framework, we take a lead from the idea that a proper thing falls under a sortal: we
characterize proper things semantically by way of characterizing sortal predicates.
This idea certainly has a (neo-)Aristotelian ring to it, but we endorse the thought
that “a view is not necessarily wrong because Aristotle held it” (Prior, 1967a, 10).19
It is difficult to determine what the proper sortal predicates are. At the level
of abstraction of this paper, we can leave that open (see note 18). We will simply
assume that there is an (intensional) predicate of predicates, Sortal, such that F is
a sortal predicate iff Sortal(F) is true.20 Some useful assumptions about Sortal
are the following:
• If Sortal(F) and α is a singular term, then if there is a case in which α
exists and falls under F (i.e., if it is true that ♦(Eα & Fα)), then α falls
under F in all cases in which it exists ((Eα → Fα)). Once a cat, always
a cat. Bressan calls this “quasi-modal constancy”; the “quasi” comes in
because nonexistence at some cases is allowed for. This principle encodes
our commonsensical idea that transsubstantiation doesn’t occur: if we have
correctly specified the sortal under which something falls, then that sortal
will stick, as it were, for life.21
19We are of course not after any specific thesis that the historical Aristotle held. It is a fact,
however, that the label “Aristotelianism”, or “neo-Aristotelianism”, for a view of things as belonging
to sorts has wide currency.
20Case-intensional semantics easily provides the necessary higher-order machinery. For details,
see Bressan (1972) or, more compactly, Belnap (2006) and Belnap and Müller (2012).
21In this specific sense we may say that transsubstantiation, which has been a matter of life and
death in the history of Christianity, is indeed, but luckily more theoretically, a matter of life and
death.
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• If Sortal(F) and α and β are singular terms, then if there is a case in
which α and β exist, both fall under F , and they coincide in that case
(♦(Eα & Fα & Fβ & α = β )), then α and β are identical in all cases, i.e.,
they fully coincide ((α = β )). There is thus no overlap between things
of the same sort. No two cats in the same place. Note that this leaves it
open that there might be overlap in the sense that, for example, there is both
a statue and a lump of clay constituting the statue at the same place, even
though they are not identical: two different proper things of different sorts
might very well have the same extension in one case.22
Bressan calls this principle “quasi-modal separation”; together with quasi-
modal constancy, we have specified his notion of “quasi-absoluteness”.
We do not take a stance here as to whether Sortal is fully characterized via quasi-
absoluteness—ultimately this will depend on the set of cases Γ under considera-
tion, and an informal notion of naturalness may have to be invoked in addition. At
least it should be clear that our framework has the resources to spell out the logical
aspects of the predicate Sortal in as much detail as is needed.
A proper thing is, then, an object of reference (an individual intension) that
falls under a sortal. Thus,
PT (α)⇔∃F (Sortal(F) & Fα).
Let us see how this works out in the case of the cat, Hannibal. (We will discuss the
appropriate set of cases Γ in §4 below; here we simply take cases to be times.) Cat
is a sortal; Sortal(Cat) is true in any case. We abbreviate the singular term, “Han-
nibal”, as “h”. To say that Hannibal is a cat, is to apply the intensional predicate
Cat, which “looks beyond” any particular case. Cats have cat-histories; things that
have different histories, even if they momentarily were to look like a cat, aren’t
cats. There is pretty widespread consensus about this role of a thing’s history for
its belonging to a sort; for two rather different views agreeing on this, see, e.g.,
the swampman thought experiment by Davidson (1987), and Thompson (2003).
Given our present distinction between objects of reference and proper things, we
can support this position in the following way. Let the singular term “c” have as its
referent a proper thing different from Hannibal, say a teacup. There are, therefore,
individual intensions int(c) and int(h) that represent the cup and the cat, respec-
tively, and that fully specify their histories. Now define the individual intension I
22We do not wish to take a stance on this issue; here it is enough to point out that the logical
framework leaves this open as a metaphysical question, by being able to represent both options. Case-
intensional logic is not metaphysics-driven logic, but meant to be a tool for clarifying metaphysical
questions by providing adequate formal representations of differing views.
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as follows:
I(γ) =
{
(int(h))(γ) for γ = t0,
(int(c))(γ) for γ 6= t0.
Let “Hcup” be a singular term that has the individual intension I as its object of
reference. (No problem; maybe that is Peter’s favourite object.) In case t0, i.e.,
locally to case t0, this object of reference has, by assumption, the same extension
as “Hannibal” in that case: extt0(h) = (int(h))(t0) = I(t0) = extt0(“Hcup”). Ac-
cordingly, in case t0, “Hcup = h” is true; it is impossible to distinguish Hcup from
Hannibal by focusing on case t0 alone. It would however be wrong to say that Hcup
is a cat: it clearly isn’t; any other case will show this. And even if we change the
definition of I to
I(γ) =
{
(int(h))(γ) for γ ≥ t0,
(int(c))(γ) for γ < t0,
which may be a more appropriate candidate for Peter’s favourite object, what we
get is not a cat, but something like a swamp-cat: something that, even though it
may forever be indistinguishable from a cat after t0, isn’t a cat since it doesn’t have
a cat’s history. In order to see whether some object of reference (an individual
intension) is a proper thing of a specific sort, one needs to look further than any
given case. Sortal predication, and therefore the notion of a proper thing, is highly
intensional.
4 Moments as cases: a case-intensional discussion of per-
sistence
We haven’t been precise so far in specifying what our set of cases Γ should be
for a proper discussion of proper things and their indeterminism and persistence.
Accordingly, we have left it vague what we take to be the extensions in D. In line
with the overall aim of our paper, now is the time to commit.
We hold that ultimately, a realistic environment for the discussion of indeter-
minism and persistence will have to be based on cases in branching time or, more
adequately, in branching space-time. These frameworks pose technical challenges
that we need not discuss here.23 It will be sufficient to give a temporal reading to
Γ and to discuss the question of persistence independently of the question of de
23See Belnap and Müller (2012) for details. The branching time framework, based on ideas by
Kripke (see Ploug and Øhrstrøm, 2011), Prior (1967b), and Thomason (1970), is described in detail
in Belnap et al. (2001). It is important, in combining time and modality, to allow for incompatible
cases at the same (clock-)time, so the cases shouldn’t be called “times”, but “moments”. Ockhamist
semantics for the future tense further complicates matters. For branching space-times, see Belnap
(1992) and Müller (2010).
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re modality, simply assuming the case-intensional semantic framework that was
motivated by these two phenomena together.
Our cases are therefore temporal; we can take them to be moments. Thus,
a term will have an extension at any given moment; the “throwaway” extension
N will represent the fact that the term in question has no extension at a given
moment. An individual intension will accordingly be a function from moments to
extensions. Again, things, the referents of singular terms, which have a history, are
properly represented by the intensions, not the extensions: the referent of a singular
term, an object of reference, is an individual intension, a function from moments
to extensions.
What are these extensions? This question is of course important for our se-
mantics, but also for its interpretation vis-à-vis the persistence debate. In a given
case (at a given time), the extension of a term will have to be something that “fits”
into the case; it cannot as it were extend beyond that case (see §3.6 above). Given
the fact that cases are momentary points of time, an extension therefore has to be
something that is not temporally extended. This makes it plausible to take the ex-
tensions to be either stages, or states, of things. We go for the former. Note that,
as laid out above, the extensions, i.e., the stages, are not themselves things. Our
semantic choice for stages as extensions does not commit us to the existence of
Stages as proper things. It may be (in the neutral sense of: “the framework does
not exclude”—see note 22) that there are Stages: proper things that only exist in a
single case, so that we may, in some weak and potentially confusing sense, identify
them with their one non-trivial extension. We take this to be a broadly empirical
question, which we refrain from addressing here.
Now let us move closer to the question of persistence: we want to model the
true fact that Hannibal once was a kitten, but isn’t any longer. In order to keep
things simple, we will not speak about a cat being a kitten or not in a given case
(kitten is a phased sortal predicate, which has intensional semantics again); rather,
we will use the extensional predicate of weighing more than 1kg, K. In order to
model the fact that Hannibal the cat once was a kitten, weighing less than or equal
to 1kg (¬K(h) in case m1), and now weighs more than 1kg (K(h) in case m2),
we have to have, minimally, the two cases m1 and m2 (Γ = {m1,m2}) and two
extensions c1 6= N and c2 6= N, cat-stages if you wish (so, including the throw-
away, D = {N,c1,c2}). The individual intension that h refers to, J, is the function
mapping m1 to c1 and m2 to c2. This individual intension we take to fall under the
extension of the sortal predicate Cat at all cases (remember quasi-modal constancy,
§3.8).
Being of a real sort (being a cat), Hannibal persists, and so it makes sense to
ask how his persistence is reflected in our framework. It turns out that our frame-
work is sufficiently neutral to allow an interpretation in terms of either endurance,
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perdurance, or exdurance. We look at the three contenders in turn.
Endurantism. Hannibal exists at each of the two cases in question: h has a non-
empty extension there (J(m1) 6= N; J(m2) 6= N). To say that it is one and the same
cat that weighs less than 1kg in one case (at m1) and not in another case (at m2), is
to say that the referent of the singular term h is the same individual intension I (the
same function from cases to extensions), independently of the case. The difference
in the application of the (extensional) predicate K is due to the different extensions
at the two cases. Hannibal is, if you wish, “wholly present” in both cases: he has a
non-empty extension at both m1 and at m2, and none of his parts is missing in any
case. The extensions are three-dimensional stages, but crucially, they are not cats,
nor any other proper things, nor are they temporal parts of a cat: cats have tails,
paws etc. as their spatial parts, but no temporal parts.
This appears to be a simple, coherent account of what is going on, without any
need for revision.
Perdurantism. For the perdurantist, there is no important distinction between
extension and referent. The extension of the term h is a space-time worm; in our
simple model, this amounts to taking the extension of h to be the graph of the func-
tion J, represented, for example, by the set that has as elements the pairs 〈m1,c1〉
and 〈m2,c2〉. To say that Hannibal weighed less than 1kg in case m1 is to say,
on that view, that there is a temporal part of the space-time worm (of the graph),
which is a thing itself, that weighs less than 1kg; in our example, this will be the
stage at m1, c1. Another temporal part of the worm, c2, is heavier. This is exten-
sional predication. Intensional predication can be accounted for as well: it can be
read as predication of the whole worm.
From the point of view of case-intensional semantics, this reading is similar
to endurantism—what a singular term refers to is rather similar in both cases (the
function vs. its graph). Endurantism, as the home theory of case-intensional se-
mantics, however also speaks about extensions at cases: the values of the intension-
function, which are extensional entities that are themselves not things. Perduran-
tism, in comparison, trades a merely semantic phenomenon—the difference be-
tween the extension of a term in a case and its intensional reference—for a meta-
physical theory of temporal parts of things, which themselves have to be yet more
things. This appears to be unnecessarily revisionistic. Once the semantics is clari-
fied, there is no need for the ontological move implied by perdurantism any more.
Exdurantism. Exdurantism, as proposed by Sider (1996, 2001), collapses exten-
sions and referents in the other direction: according to that view, the term h refers
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to its endurantist extension in a given case, which is a stage. All predication there-
fore has to be extensional—there simply is nothing over and above the extensions
to predicate anything of. A temporal counterpart relation is needed in order to bind
together the various extensions to form something like a persisting thing.
This view nicely captures the extensional aspects of our endurantist theory, but
it falls short of the intensional aspects. These all need to be simulated by means of
a counterpart relation. Therefore, exdurantism is also highly revisionistic, taking
us to be referring to momentarily existing, instantaneously vanishing entities when
we think we are referring to, e.g., a cat as something that has a history.
There is no need to go along with this type of revisionism once we see that
the semantic basis that allows a complicated reading in terms of exdurantism, also
allows for a perfectly simple reading in terms of endurantism.
5 Conclusion
We have used the phenomena of indeterminism, in the sense of de re modality,
and persistence, to motivate the semantical framework of case-intensional seman-
tics, which allows a detailed characterization of the proper things to which indeter-
minism and persistence are attributable. The temporal reading of that semantical
framework, laid out in §4, allows for the representation of all three major positions
in the persistence debate: endurantism, perdurantism, and exdurantism. We claim
that this supports the view that endurantism, our commonsensical theory of persis-
tence, wins the day: there is no need for revision, as any purported advantages of
the revisionistic positions of perdurantism and exdurantism come to nothing, given
the semantical equivalence that we have shown.
Commonsensical endurantist persistence ain’t broke. There is no need to fix it.
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